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OF MACE AND MEN: TORT LAW AS A MEANS
OF CONTROLLING DOMESTIC CHEMICAL
WARFARE
JOSEPH

A.

PAGE*

The use of MACE and other chemical sprays by the police and the
public has caused considerable comment and controversy during the last
several years. Recognizing the seriousness of the problem, Professor Page
analyzes the efficacy of present law to control the misuse of chemical
sprays. In this analysis Professor Page first discusses the deve/opmellt of
the use of MACE and the heated controversy that surrounds both its
employment and potentially deleterious effects. He then turns to the
application of intentional tort, negligence, warranty, and strict liability
concepts as methods by which victims of MACE might hold the user or
manufacturer liable for injuries incurred. He then concludes that although
legislation exists that to some degree can be utilized to regulate the public
sales of chemical sprays, it has been left to the courts to impose effective
public restraints on police use of these weapons.
I've grown accustomed to the MACE,
I breathe it out, I breathe it in,
I've grown accustomed to that breeze
That knocks me to my knees,
One whiff, one sniff,
And I go stiff,'

In 1965, several police departments around the country purchased
and initiated use of a new weapon, destined to have a considerable
impact on law enforcement techniques.2 Manufactured by the General
Ordinance Equipment Corporation (GOEC)3 and marketed under the
trade name CHEMICAL MACE~~ this innovation in police
*A.B., 1955, LL.B., 1958, LL.M., 1964, Harvard University. Associate Professor of Law,
Georgetown University Law Center. Member of the Massachusetts Bar.
1 From a parody included in "Dock-et To Me," in the Annual Christmas Spirits Production
of the <:;hicago Bar Association, in Chicago, Ill., Dec. 16-20, 1968, reprinted with permission.
•see generally Applegate, The Chemical Mace: Evaluation of a New Police Weapon for
Mob Control or Individual Defense. LAW AND ORDER, June 1966, at 48; Coates, Safe Police
Weapons, Sci. & TECHNOLOGY, May 1968, at 52; Sagalyn & Coates, Wanted: Police Weapons
That Do Not Kill. N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1967 (Magazine), at 6.
3 For an excellent account of the invention of MACE and its early promotion, see G.' WILLS,
THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 87-95 (1968) (paperback).
'CHEMICAL MACE and MACE are trademarks of the General Ordnance Equipment
Corporation. CHEMICAL MACE reg. U.S., Pat. Off. As used in this article, MACE refers
specifically to the aforementioned product. Other spray devices arc similarly indicated by the usc
of all capitals.
In common parlance the word "mace" is often used generically to describe any similar
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weaponry was originally invented as a self-protection device for use by
the general public.5 Its potential in the .field of law enforcement,
however, gained quick recognition, and it soon became celebrated as
an allegedly humane alternative to the pistol and billy club.6
CHEMICAL MACE, or MACE as it is more commonly known,
is a liquid, pressurized in small canisters that can be carried in the
hand or even built into the tip of a nightstick.7 The canister projects a
stream of chemical droplets that vaporize on contact and take
immediate effect. Although MACE was not the first chemical spray
adopted for use by individual policemen, earlier sprays projected a fog
or mist that was not selective and could blow back on the user in
adverse weather conditions.8 In comparison, because MACE takes the
form of a relatively heavy liquid spray, it can be utilized effectively
against selected individuals and thus eliminates the risk of the hunter
becoming the quarry. Its effect upon the victim, as described by one
police consultant, is such that: "[W]hen even a small percentage of
the droplet burst pattern strikes the face, an intense burning and
tearing action takes place. . . . The combination of the two effects
will temporarily distract, disable and incapacitate the recipient. " 9
THE RISING USE OF CHEMICAL SPRAYS AS POLICE WEAPONS

MACE quickly became popular, as favorable publicity led to
additional orders from law enforcement groups, which in turn led to
even greater publicity.1° For the new product, 1967 proved to be an
auspicious year. Urban unrest stimulated the full emergence of the
"law-and-order" issue as a matter of pressing national concern. At
the same time, police began to use MACE to quell social and political
disorders.U
chemical aerosol spray. Widespread use of the noun "mace" and the verb "to mace" has
become a matter of great concern to GOEC, lest the terms become generic and the trademark
rights be lost. See letter from GOEC's President John A. Campbell in CoM~IONWEAL, Apr. 18,
1969, at 142.
$Pittsburgh physicist Alan Litman invented CHEMICAL MACE to provide his wife with a
self-defense weapon. G. WILLS, supra note 3, at 91. It is interesting to note that its usage has
begun to revert to this original purpose. See notes 18-19 infra and accompanying text.
•see. e.g.. Applegate, supra note 2, at 51; TIME, Sept. I, 1967, at 10.
7 Coates, supra note 2, at 54-55.
"Applegate, supra note 2, at 51-52. In addition, some of these earlier devices were considered
unreliable because of malfunctions in the delivery system. See note 17 infra.
"Applegate, supra note 2, at 53.
10
ln order to meet the increasing demand, GOEC quadrupled its production during a two
month period in the summer of 1967. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 10, 1967, at I, col. 4; see, e.g.•
Duncan, Mace: The Methods of Madness, RAMPARTS, June 29, 1968, at 62; TIME, Jan. 3, 1969,
at 60; Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch, Oct. 17, 1966, § B, at 10, col. 3.
"See. e.g., TI~IE, May 17, 1968, at 52; San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 18, 1967, at 13, col. I.
See also G. WILLS, supra note 3, at 94-95.
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Because of the overemphasis on its capacity to disable, MACE
originally acquired a somewhat deceptive mystique. The use of terms
such as "instant apathy" 12 and "stun gun " 13 gave currency to the
impression that it contained some mysterious new chemical, perhaps
even nerve gasY According to officials in Newburgh, N.Y., the mere
presence of MACE canisters hanging from the belts of policemen was
enough to cut short a civil disturbance during the summer of 1967 .JG
However, in actuality, MACE is no more than liquid
chloroacetenophenone (CN), the basic ingredient in standard tear gas,
with a kerosene-like substance added to make the spray stick and
persist.t 6
GOEC's CHEMICAL MACE was not the only aerosol spray
being manufactured during this period for sale to law enforcement
agencies}? Although some of the other sprays failed to interest the
police, they soon joined a variety of chemical aerosol weapons being
offered for sale to the general public.t 8 Even MACE itself has begun
Riot Control, SAT. EVE. PosT, Apr.20, 1968, at 30; TI~IE, May 5, 1967, at 50.
"Harvey, Stun Gun: Sleeve Ace for Good Guys. Alexandria (La.) Town Talk, Mav 25.
1967, reprinted in GEOC, Chemical Mace (promotional material) (on file with author).
usee. e.g.. P. O'DONNELL, A TASTE FOR DEATH 172 (1969); Leman, MAC£: Weapotl for
the Homefront, 'viET-REPORT, Jan. 1968, at 21. Contra. Maury, Dispelling the Myths of
Aerosol Liquid Tear Gas Weaponry, LAW AND ORDER, Dec. 1967 (reprint on file with author).
'~N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1967, at 17, col. 2.
"See Applegate, supra note 2, at 53; Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, Fact
Sheet on Chemical Mace, enclosed in letter from William H. Stewart, Surgeon General of the
Public Health Service, to All Health Officers (state, territorial, county, and city), May 2, 1968.
See generally. HUDDLE, Tt:AR GAS FOR RIOT COSTROL 21-2~(Legislative Reference Service,
Library of Congress, SP 147, March 5, 1968). For a discussion of pre-MACE tear gas weapons,
see T. SWEARINGEN, TEAR GAS MUNITIONS (1966).
17
GOEC's foremost competitor appears to be Federal Laboratories which produces
PEACEMAKER and STREAMER. CN sprays using a formula similar to that of MACE.
Other less successful competitors include Penguin Industries, maker of the CN spray DEPUTY.
and Maze Chemical and Mfg. Corp., maker of the CS spray PARALYZER. which is available
to the public and is the only CS spray currently on the general market.
MARKETING/Com!UNICATION. Dec. 1968, at 60. Both the DEPUTY and the PEACEMAKER
have been found unsatisfactory by at least one police department. See memorandum from W. J.
Collier. Crime Detection Lab, to Capt. R. Newton, Phoenix (Ariz.) Police Dept., August 25,
29, 1967, on file with author (DEPUTY's nozzle clogged, its range was only four feel, the
container leaked and it produced a mist instead of a stream).
CS sprays, which are comprised of chlorobenzylmalononitrile, a tear gas more powerful than
CN in fog, smoke, or powder form, are considered ineffective since no eye irration results unless
the spray directly contacts the eye surface, and undesirable since the effects arc of unnecessarily
long duration because the agent tends to stay on the affected area rather than evaporate. Set•
Crockett, Riot Control Agents, THE Pol.ICE C111t:t-. reb. 1969, at 12, 13.
'"The whole area of chemical aerosal sprays has recently become the focus of congressional
attention. See Hearings on the Public Sale of Protective Ch!•mical .'>'prays Before the Subcomm.
for Con.\Umers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce. 91st Cong .. 1st Sess. (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Consumer Hearings] (because these hearings have not yet been officially published,
12
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to find its way into the hands of the public.19 A predictable corollary
has been the increased use of aerosol weapons by criminals.20 •
Early in 1968, the use of chemical weapons by law enforcement
agencies received two important boosts. President Johnson, in a
message to Congress, stated that "[r ]evolvers and nightsticks are
clearly inadequate . . .. New weappns and chemicals-effective but
causing no permanent injury-have been and are being developed."21
Recognizing the limited knowledge of their potential and limitations,
the President ordered that studies of the new weapons be undertaken.22
The second boost occurred shortly thereafter when the National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, in discussing police
weapons, stressed "the urgent need for nonlethal alternatives, " 23 and
recommended that the Government "undertake an immediate
program to test and evaluate nonlethal weapons. " 24
These statements, while endorsing the need for nonlethal police
weapons such as chemical sprays, also underscored a disquieting
aspect of the increased development and employment of MACE. Both
the President and his Commission spoke of the need for research and
testing; the sprays, however, had been widely used for more than two
years.25 Their statements perhaps reflected concern for the growing
MACE controversy, which paralleled the stepped-up police use of the
sprays and their subsequent availability to the general public.
THE MACE CONTROVERSY

An analysis of the MACE controversy reveals two levels of
criticism and rebuttal. One concerns the question whether even when
properly handled, chemical sprays may cause an amount of physical
harm disproportionate to t~at which the manufacturers claim and the
citations herein refer to the printed statements of the witnesses on file with the author). See also
Page, Mace for the Masses, ComiOSWJ:AL, Apr. Ill, 1969, at 141. There is very little data on
how many of these weapons are in the hands of the public. In Aug. 1968 the Wall Street
Journal reported that franchisers in 31 states had sold 250,000 PREVENTORS. a spray using
the MACE formula. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 15, 1968, at 4, col. 2.
"See Page, supra note 18; MAYDAY, Nov. ·24-Dec. 6, 1968, at I.
"'See Page, supra note 18, at 143; CRI~IE CONTROL DIGEST, Feb. 28, 1968, at 16; N.Y.
Times, May 13, 1969, at I, col. 7; Washington Post, Apr. 2, 1969, § A. at 10, col. 2.
%ll. JOHNSON. THE CHALLENGE OF CR!~IE TO OUR SOCIETY. H.R. Doc. No. 250, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1968).
:!:lid.
:!:!NATIONAL ADVISORY CO~I~t'N ON CiVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 330-31 (Bantam ed., 1968).
: 11d. at 492.
10 By Mar. 1968, more than 3,000 law enforcement agencies had adopted aerosol sprays for
use. CRI~U: COSTROL DIGEST. Mar. 13, 1968, at 7.
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users intend. The other concerns risks of injury created by improper
use of the sprays.
POTENTIAL FOR INJURY

The manufacturers of the sprays and the law enforcement agencies
that have adopted them continually insist that the new weapons can
cause only temporary harm to the victim.26 The record, however,
would seem to establish beyond cavil that the testing of sprays before
they were put on the market was not particularly thorough.27 Police
departments often staged demonstrations with the sprays, but these
were more in the nature of public relations performances than
scientific experiments and took place only after the decision to adopt
the sprays had been reached.28 In essence, inadequately tested chemical
sprays were being added to police arsenals.
It is not surprising, therefore, that protests were soon raised. The
most vigorous came from Dr. Lawrence Rose, a San Francisco
opthalmologist, who reported 12 cases of MACE exposure.29 In each
26
The directions for the use of MK IV CHEMICAL MACE state that the victim will be
"temporarily disabled without permanent injury or marking . . . . " The New York Times has
reported GOEC's president as claiming "[t]here is no lasting damage . . . and within a half
hour the person has completely recovered." N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1967, at 17, col. 3. A UPI
dispatch attributed to Alan Litman, the inventor of MACE, the statement that "there are no
known toxic after effects." Washington Evening Star, Aug. 4, 1967, § A at 3, col. 3.
Perhaps the ultimate claim is the item in Time that some policemen call MACE the "gentle
persuader." TIME, Sept. I, 1967, at 10.
The sprays actually do eliminate the principal danger of the tear gas gun, a weapon which
has been in existence for decades. The guns fire cartridges filled with tear gas, which when
discharged at close range, can inflict permanent damage by causing fragments of wadding,
metal, or solid particles of the tear gas itself to penetrate the eye of the victim. See, e.g., Adams,
Fee & Kenmore, Tear-Gas Injuries: A Clinical Study of Hand Injuries and an Experimental
Study of its Effects on Peripheral Nerves and Skeletal Muscles in Rabbits, 48 J. OF BONE AND
JOINT SURGERY 436 (1966) (Am. Vol.); Hoffman, Eye Burns Caused by Tear Gas, 51 BRIT. J.
OPTHALMOLOGY 265 (1967); Levine & Stahl, Eye Injury Caused by Tear-Gas Weapons, 65 AM.
J. OPHTHALMOLOGY 497 (1968). The delivery mechanism of the sprays does away with this
particular hazard.
27
GOEC sponsored two experiments involving nine animals. Neither test indicated any
injurious effects other than a redness of the eyes which disappeared in 72 hours. The sprays were
discharged, however, at a distance of six feet. Hazleton Laboratories, Inc., Acute Eye IrritationRabbits: Mark IV Formula, Final Report, Apr. 12, 1966; Hazleton Laboratories, Inc., Acute
Contact Exposure-Monkey: Mark IV Type A Chemical Mace, Final Report, Mar. 8, 1966;
(reports submitted to GO EC; on file with author) .
.,.See, e.g., (Rochester, N.Y.) Democrat and Chronicle, Aug. 3, 1967, § B, at I, col. 4; letter
from Jarrett Williams, President of the Taylor-Jones County Medical Society, Abilene, Texas,
to Warren Dodson, Chief of the Abilene Police Department, Jul. 31, 1967, on file with the
author. After testing MACE on four persons in a single experiment, followed the next day by an
eye examination, the Society was "convinced and assured that the material produces no lasting
injuries." Letter from Jarrett Williams, supra.
""Rose, Mace, A Dangerous Police Weapon, PROCEEDINGS OF 3RD CONGRESS, EUROPEAN
Soc. OF OPHTHALMOLOGY, June 1968, at 448.
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instance his patients had been hit in the face by a liquid stream from
a distance of six to 12 inches and subsequently had been afforded no
opportunity to wash out their eyes. Each suffered serious injuries.30
Dr. Rose also conducted tests on three rabbits, whose eyes were
sprayed with MACE at a distance of six inches. He reported that one
rabbit "developed a dense scar in the line of vision. " 31
An article in the New Republic, arguing that MACE could "add
another dimension to police brutality," raised the first objections to
the weapon on a national level.32 In addition, a number of
developments since that time have fortified the heightening criticism
of chemical sprays. In the spring of 1968, the Federal Bureau of
Prisons issued a policy statement forbidding prison personnel to carry
aerosol chemical dispensers except when authorized, limiting such
authorization to situations in which a single prisoner "barricades
himself and cannot be approached without definite danger to
personnel or to himself. " 33 The report further called for the immediate
treatment of prisoners who had been sprayed.34
Less than two months later, the Surgeon General made public a
warning letter which attracted nationwide attention.35 In cautious
language, he noted that "the design of 'Chemical Mace' . . . clearly
increases the possibility of more than transient effects to the exposed
individual unless treatment is prompt," and set forth instructions on
the proper treatment of MACE victims.36 A supplemental fact sheet,
however, admitted that "[t]he available evidence regarding the effects
:so Four suffered second degree burns of the eyelids and facial skin. One sustained a superficial
corneal scar outside the line of vision. In four cases, the victims "experienced confused
cerebration with an accompanying difficulty in answering simple questions, loss of recent memory.
dysequilibrium, and apprehension which lasted one to two hours after exposure." All incurred
an intense burning pain on the eyes and skin, and some respiratory difficulty. /d.
~• /d. at 451.
"Rapoport, Mace in the Face, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 13, 1968, at 14, 15. Other
subsequent publications and disclosures fueled the growing controversy over the use of MACE.
A pediatrician, treating a teenager who had been sprayed by police, said "[t]here's no question
about it (Mace) being bad for the respiratory system where there is already a lot of edema
(swelling) in bronchial troubles, such as asthma." York (Pa.) Gazette and Daily, Apr. 4, 1968.
A prison physician has gone so far as to say that "[I]f a person has heart trouble or acute asthma,
this man could suffer a fatal dosage." /d. See also Kalman •. -I Critique c~{ M.-1 CE. .-1 Rim Comrol
Agent, CALIFORNIA's HEALTH, Sept. 1968, at 3 (significant increase of victim's blood pressure):
testimony of Dr. Stuart Frank to the San Francisco City Council on the Toxic Effects of Chemical
MACE. May 9, 1968, on file with author.
:llBUREAU OF PRISONS, POLICY STATEMENT, No. 20300.1 (Mar. 25, 1968).
~ 1 ld.

""Letter from William H. Stewart, Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, to All
Health Officers (state, territorial, county, and city), May 2, 1968. See also NEWSWEEK. June 10.
1968, at 79; TI~IE, May 17, 1968, at 52; Washington Post, May 3, 1968, § A. at I, col. 7.
""Letter from William H. Stewart, supra note 35.
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is not complete and does not permit the drawing of final
conclusions at this time. " 37
On June 6, 1968, a research team from the Department of
Pharmacology at the University of Michigan published the results of
an investigation of Mark IV CHEMICAL MACE, undertaken at the
behest of the Ann Arbor City Council and Department of Police. The
study underscored the danger of injury "if the lachrymator were
liberated in large quantities in a small room or other confined space,
since breathing to survive would result in inhalation of the gas in spite
of its irritant properties, " 38 and pointed out that "misuse of Chemical
Mace . . . has a potential for injury or even death."39 Another study,
released by the Berkeley, Cal., Director of Public Health, concluded,
inter alia, that MACE is a potentially dangerous weapon,~ 0 and that
its hazards are greatly increased if improperly used.~ 1
The criticism and controversy over the use of sprays has
continued,42 marked by such startling revelations as the failure of
MACE to meet Army safety requirements.43 A review of th~ available
evidence, however, brings to light certain indisputable gaps in what is
known about the potential hazards of the sprays. Almost all the
testing has involved MACE and has focused on the risk of eye
injury .44 Minimal attention has been devoted to other kinds of harm.
Surgeon General, supra note 16.
••Report ·or Macleod, Villarreal & Seevers, Dept. of Pharmacology, Medical School,
University of Michigan, to Ann Arbor Police Dept., June 6, 1968, at 7 [hereinafter cited as
Michigan Report]. The experiments upon which the Report was in part based are described in
Macleod, Chemical Mace: Ocular Effects in Rabbits and Monkeys, 14 J. FORENSIC Sci. 34
(1969).
39
Michigan Report 8. The Report further suggests that MACE can be used safely if the
victim is alert, has normal protective reflexes, such as blinking, and is sprayed with the
minimum dosage necessary for incapacitation. Severe or possibly permanent damage, however,
may occur from direct exposure of the eye to the spray due to misuse of the weapon. Such
misuse could result from a direct discharge into the eye area at close range, a prolonged
discharge into the face or eyes, or an excessive discharge in a closed space. The Report also
notes that there is no evidence to indicate the possibility of significant injury other than to
the eyes, skin, or mucous membranes, and that such injury would be due to the CN agent, not
the solvent or propellant. Id. at I 8- I 9.
~ 0 Memorandum on "Use of Mace" from Alvin R. Leonard, M.D., Director of Public
Health, Berkeley, Cal., to William C. Hanley, City Mgr., Berkeley, Cal., Sept. 5, 1968.
~·"With proper and prudent use, the danger of serious or permanent damage from this
weapon is minimal. With improper use (too close to the person, person lacking normal reflexes,
in a closed space), or delay in post-exposure treatment, the hazard increases sharply." /d.
usee, e.g.• Washington Post, Feb. 23, 1969, § A, at 21, col. I (D.C. doctor discloses
possibility of permanent lung and kidney damage).
"Letter from Brig. Gen. Donald D. Blackburn, Acting Deputy Chief of Research and
Development, Department of the Army, to Senator Abraham Ribicoff, May 15, 1969, reprinted
in Office of Senator Ribicoff, Press Release, May 19, 1969, on file with author. But see Forberg
& Byers, Chemical Mace: A Non-Lethal Weapon, 9 J. TRAUMA 339 (1969).
"See notes 27-28, 30 supra.
37
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Some data exists on PEACEMAKER45 and STREAMER,46 but
virtually nothing is available on the numerous other irritants offered
for sale to the police and the general public.47
MISUSE OF SPRAYS

At least two explanations can be offered for the misuse of the·
sprays. First, the manufacturers made such extravagant claims
concerning the harmlessness of the new weapons48 and the law
enforcement agencies adopting them gave such inadequate instructions
to the individuals to whom they were issued that improper handling
was inevitable.49 An illustration which lends support to this argument
is the police practice of resorting to chemical sprays during civil
disturbances.5° Claims by GOEC of MACE's effectiveness in riot
control,51 combined with pressures on police to meet the challenge of
urban disorders, have led to reliance on MACE as a weapon against
demonstrators. In actual practice, however, the police often direct the
spray indiscriminately at crowds or groups in order to disperse them.52
In these circumstances it is virtually impossible to provide prompt
medical treatment to MACE victims.
t 5See note 17 supra.
"Hazleton Laboratories, Inc., Acute Eye Irritation-Rabbits: Sample "F", Final Report,
Jan. 19, 1968 (submitted to Federal Laboratories, Inc.; copy on file with author).
nThe Younger Laboratories of St. Louis, Mo., conducted experiments using PARALYZER
and concluded that the weapon was not an irritant to the skin, but was an eye irritant. The eyes
of the three rabbits used in the tests cleared after 72 hours. Younger Laboratories, Certificate of
Analysis ["Paralyzer"], Feb. 6, 1969 (submitted to Maze Chern. & Mfg. Corp.; copy on file
with author).
It is interesting to note that GOEC has purportedly stated that "several competitive devices
have come on the market of (sic) different formulation which have caused some injuries.
[GOEC] ascribes these injuries -to an excessive Chloroacetenophonone content and/or an inept
choice of organic carrier solvents." Michigan Report 7.
"See note 26 supra.
taWhether such inadequacy is sufficient to constitute a legal wrong should be forthcoming as
a result of damage suits alleging that instructions given to police officers in the use of chemical
sprays were inadequate. See cases cited note 68 infra.
A consultant to the International Association of Chiefs of Police testified before the Senate's
Consumer Subcommittee that, regardless of instructions, it was unrealistic to expect policemen
not to aim at the victim's face when using a chemical spray in any sort of emergency situation.
Consumer Hearings. supra note 18 (testimony of Thompson S. Crockett). The Michigan Report
suggests that discharge of a spray in this manner constitutes misuse of the weapon. Michigan
Report, supra note 38, at 7-8.
""See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
51
See Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch, Oct. 17, 1966, § B, at 10, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Aug. 3,
1967, at 17, col. 3. See generally Applegate, supra note 2, at 76.
"'One police expert has testified that this tactic can cause the people in the front ranks of the
crowd to be trampled, and hence is improper. Consumer Hearings (testimony of Thompson S.
Crockett).
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A second explanation of excessive use of MACE is that it is
merely another aspect of the police brutality problem. A possible new
dimension is that the sprays require so little physical effort to fire that
they ·may actually encourage the conscious application of
unreasonable force, perhaps even as a punitive measure. Beyond
scattered individual accounts of police brutality in the use of sprays,
there is very little empirical data on this point. The Walker Report on
violence at the Democratic Convention in Chicago, which describes
twelve incidents in which the police employed MACE,53 is perhaps the
closest approximation to a comprehensive study of the use of MACE
during a civil disturbance. Each of the incidents arguably amounted
to the use of unjustified or excessive force. On the other hand, a
survey made by the Berkeley police department of 85 uses of MACE
by the department over an IS-month period found only four instances
of improper use. ~
5

ADDITIONAL OBJECTIONS TO MACE

In addition to the risk of bodily injury from the sp'ray itself,
another hazard merits mention. In certain situations, chemical
irritants may not repel assailants-the sprays may not affect persons
under the influence of drugs or liquor, as well as lunatics and
individuals in a state of extreme emotional excitement.55 MACE,
therefore, may act as an escalator rather than a pacifier in civil
disturbances, since it tends to enrage victims with a sense of
humiliation and impotence,S 6 possibly even leading to the use of
''countersprays'' by demonstrators.57
"'RIGHTS IN CONFLICT: THE WALKER REPORT TO THE NATIONAl Co~t~t'S ON nw CAUSES
AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE 176, 200, 202-03, 259, 269, 274, 281-82, 317, 323-24 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as WALKER REPORT).
"'BERKELEY POLICE DEP"T. USE OF "CHE)IICAl MACE" 1-2 (City Manager Report :\o. 6837, 1968).
05 See id. at 2; Crockett, Riot Control Agents, THE POLICE CHIEF, Feb. 1969, 13.
Notwithstanding the high state of emotion of rioters and attackers, some of the sprays on sale
to the public advertise that they can rout such crowds. See. e.g .. Silver Spring-Wheaton (Md.)
Advertiser, Aug. 21, 1968, at 5 (advertisement for PREVENTOR).
••Incidents of MACE escalating resistance to police have been numerous enough to question
the wisdom of its use on large crowds. A Richmond, Va., policeman tried MACE out on a dog
"[a]nd the dog promptly tried out his teeth on the officer's leg." CRI~tE Co:-ITROJ. DIGEST, Feb.
II, 1969, at 3. In Orlando, Fla., an argument with a city clerk over a refund for a business
license ended with the man being fatally shot by the police chief who had sprayed him with
MACE to quiet him, but instead enraged him. Orlando Sentinel, June 6, 1969, at I, col. 4.
07
See WALKER REPORT 235, 238, 262, 347, 352 (evidence of uses of sprays by demonstrators
agamst law enforcement officials at 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago); N.Y. Times,
Apr. 18, 1969, at 28, col. 4 (claim that SDS militants used MACE in disturbances at Columbia
University); San Francisco Examiner, Apr. 7, 1969, at I, col. 3.
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Other objections to MACE and similar sprays go beyond the
immediate issues of bodily injury and riot control. It has been argued,
for example, that the use of MACE by police may produce such a
state of mental disarray in the victim that a subsequent arrest
infringes upon his civil liberties.58 Furthermore, in the broadest
context, the general subject of police technology carries with it the
perplexing problem whether such development should be permitted to
proceed, lest the state assume excessive power to intervene in and
control the lives of its citizens. A correlative consideration is the
extent to which a newly emerging "police-industrial complex" may
become powerful enough to influence policy by maintaining, or even
creating, a mood of fear, which will insure the continuous expenditure
of large sums of money on law enforcement hardware.59
•
Finally, there is an ethical or moral challenge to the propriety of
indulging in what amounts to chemical warfare on a domestic level. It
has been argued that since this sort of weaponry has been disavowed
internationally,60 it certainly should not be tolerated on the domestic
scene.61 The fact that the Government has resorted to the use of
chemical weapons in Vietnam 62 is, of course, no answer to this
objection. On the other hand, it is strongly urged that the use of
incapacitating chemical agents is more humane, both in war and
domestic riot control, because of its temporary, nonlethal, and less
destructive effect.63 Nevertheless, an ethical or moral distinction can
be drawn between using MACE on an individual and clubbing him
with a night stick. One approach could derive from a judgment
whether and to what extent it is permissible for society to expose a
person to chemical agents that are intentionally sprayed upon him and

.. Bodenheimer & Rose, MACE's "Secret" Formula, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May II, 1968, at
8; Duncan, supra note 10, at 63.
~•see Price, Criminal Law and Technology: Some Comments, 16 U.C.LA.L. REV. 120, 133
(1968).
60
See 2 L. 0PPENHEI~I. INTER:-;ATIONAL LAW § 113 (7th ed. 1952); Brownlie, Legal Aspects,
in CBW: CHE~IICAL A:-/D BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 143-46 {Rose ed. 1968); HUDDLE, supra note
16, at 15; 7 Co:-:G. REC. H2421 (daily ed. Apr. I, 1969) (remarks of Congressman McCarthy).
"One must recognize, however, that some of the more cogent arguments against chemical
and biological warfare-its capacity for wholesale destruction and its nonselectivity-simply do
not apply to the use of sprays by police. See Meselson, Ethical Problems-Preventing CBW, in
CBW:CHE~IICALA:-;D BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 163 {Roseed. 1968).
•tSee S. HERSH. CHE~IICAL A:-lD BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: A~IERICA 's HIDDEN ARSENAL
(1968); Kahn, CBW in Use: Vielllam, in CBW: CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 87 (Rose
ed. 1968).
6:1 Michigan Report, supra note 38, at 20. It must be admitted that if the effects of the sprays
were limited to the manufacturers' claims and if the police did not misuse these weapons, they
surely would be more "humane" than guns or nightsticks. Unfortunately, such is not the case.
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that act upon and penetrate his body without his consent. In other
words, the focus of this judgment would be on the biosphere and the
degree to which modern technology should be allowed to tamper with
it.
The most cogent argument on ethical and moral grounds,
however, is that a relaxation of restraints against the use of
"humane" sprays may invite the introduction of more powerful
chemical weapons for real or imagined needs.64 Indeed, the grim
escalation of domestic chemical warfare has already begun. CS6" was
discharged against students from a helicopter on the Berkeley college
campus; demonstrators are now using chemical weapons;66 and the
Army is about to introduce more potent CS aerosols which attack the
respiratory system.67 The end does not appear in sight.
TORT LAW

In the past year, a number of personal injury actions have been
filed against law enforcement agencies and/ or the manufacturers of
chemical sprays.68 These cases will provide the judicial process with an
opportunity to confront and assess the merits of the controversy
whieh the sprays have spawned. They may also test the contemporary
relevance of tort law. To the extent that the concern over the dangers
posed by the sprays is well founded, MACE and its kin join a wide
"'A former Defense Department official alarmingly summed up the philosophy behind the
use of chemical gas in civil situations:
'[W]e accomplish two purposes: controlling crowds and educating people on gas •• .'
so that 'we [can] control the public outcry' against chemicals which hinders their use
in wartime. 'If one could change the environment of public opinion about CBW
(chemical and biological warfare),' the official said, 'we might be able to use
something that otherwise would be ruled out.'
Hersh, Your Friendly Neighborhood MACE, N.Y. REVIEW OF BooKs, Mar. 27, 1968, at 42.
r.ssee note 17 supra .
..See note 57 supra.
67 HUDDLE, supra note 16. CS was used in substantial quantities by the Paris riot police
against rebellious French students during the events of May and June, 1968. P. LAURO, CE
N'I:ST Qt.:'us DEBUT 107-08 (1968) (paperback); U.N.E.r. & S.N.E. SUP., LE LIVRE NOIR DES
JOURNEES DE MAl 86-91 (Seuil ed. 1968) (paperback).
63 Wright v. Ryan, No. C-1268 (D. Colo., Jan. 21, 1969); Lanier v. District of Columbia, No.
2318-68 (D.D.C., Sept. 13, 1968); Gonzalo v. Arizona, No. C223343 (Ariz. Super. Ct., May 18,
1969); Miguel v. Hinderliter, No. C217921 (Ariz. Super. Ct., Nov. 22, 1968); Marcellini v. City
& County of San Francisco; No. 598081 (Cal. Super. Ct., Nov. 27, 1968); Russell v. General
Ordnance Equip. Corp., No. 591471 (Cal. Super. Ct., May 15, 1968); Marcellini v. General
Ordnance Equip. Corp., No. 589974 (Cal. Super. Ct., Apr. 2, 1968); Craig v. City of Sarasota,
No. 69-266 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Feb. 21, 1969); Jennings v. City of Winter Park, No. 68-4047 (Fla.
Cir. Ct., Sept. 6, 1968); Faulk v. City of Yonkers (N.Y. Super. Ct., July 30, 1968); Vaughan v.
City of Estacada, No. 342266 (Ore. Cir. Ct., Oct. 2, 1968). Copies of the aforementioned
complaints are on file with the author.

1969]

MACE

1249

range of hazards attributable to modern technology. The degree to
which tort law, acting through the mechanism of the private suit for
money damages, can effectuate societal control over such hazards will
furnish a useful insight into the law's vitality.69
LIABILITY OF THE USER

Battery.
In the absence of a legal privilege to do so, a policeman
or private citizen who intentionally sprays a person with a liquid
chemical or who intentionally causes vapors from such a spray to
come into contact with a person has committed an actionable
battery7° and perhaps an assault.71 If such a person has a valid claim
under a battery theory, he will be able to recover for all damages
incurred, including those which the user had no reason to believe
would result.72 Thus, although the defendant did not know and had no
reason to know of the dangerous propensities of his chemical weapon,
he nonetheless would be liable for harm which exceeded the damage
he intended to inflict.73
One privilege which can arise in intentional spray cases is that of
self-defense, whereby a policeman or private citizen will not be liable
upon proof that the plaintiff was, or reasonably appeared to be,
threatening him with harm.74 Plaintiff, however, can defeat the
privilege by establishing that the force used by defendant was
excessive75-that it was "in excess of that which the actor
correctly or reasonably believed to be necessary for his protection. ''76
A corollary to this principle is that the privilege to intentionally inflict
.,The compensation function of tort law will be tested also, but the MACE cases will add
nothing to the general question whether tort suits for money damages are an adequate and
effective means of compensating injured individuals. Of perhaps greater consequence will be the
prophylactic impact of these cases upon the use, manufacture, and sale of sprays.
70 \V. PROSSER, TORTS § 9 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as \V. PROSSER]; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. "[A)ll that is necessary is
that the actor intended to cause the other, directly or indirectly, to come into contact with a
foreign substance in a manner the other will reasonably regard as offensive." /d., comment cat
31.
71 \V. PROSSER § 10. Although no discharge takes place, a chemical spray may be used to
threaten harm. Such conduct, absent a legal privilege, could amount to an actionable assault. /d.
72 RESTATEMENT § 16(1).
13fd. § 16, comment a.
71
/d. § 63; \V. PROSSER § 19.
75 \Vall v. Zeeb, 153 N.W.2d 779 (N.D. 1967) (use of tear gas gun to effect arrest).
70
RESTATEMENT § 70(1). Defendant's good faith may be relevant on the issue of excessive
force. In an action against a police officer for injuries sustained when at close range he fired his
tear gas gun at plaintiff and caused him to lose an eye, the court held it was reversible error to
omit reference to possible good faith on the issue of excessive force. Village of Barboursville ex ref.
Bates v. Taylor, 115 W.Va. 4, 174 S.E. 485 (1934).
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serious bodily harm is limited to situations in which the defendant is
or reasonably appears, threatened with the same degree of harm.77
Thus, if plaintiff does not confront defendant with such a threat, real
or apparent, and defendant protects himself with a chemical spray,
causing serious bodily harm to plaintiff,78 the latter should be able to
recover upon proof that the user knew, or a reasonable person in his
place would have known, of the dangerous propensities of the
weapon.7 9 A policeman or a private citizen may also be privileged to
use force to effectuate an arrest80 or to prevent the commission of a
crime.81 Again, a showing of excessive force will defeat the privilege.82
Where state or local officials, including police officers,
intentionally misuse chemical weapons, injured victims may t'tilize an
additional or alternative remedy under the civil remedy section of the
Civil Rights Act,83 which enables them to sue in federal court for
damages resulting from abridgments, by officials acting under color
of state law, of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution or by federal law.84
71 W. PROSSER § 19, at 112; RESTATE~IENT § 65.
'"The Restatement defines "serious bodily harm" to include the "permanent or protracted
loss of the function of any important member or organ." RESTATEMENT § 63, comment b.
19
"The reasonable character of the means which the actor uses is determined by what a
reasonable man, under the circumstances which the actor knows or has reason to know exist at
the time, would regard as permissible in view of the danger threatening him." I d. § 63,
commentj, at 103.
If the defendant did not know, and had no reason to know, that the weapon might cause a
permanent injury, plaintiff might still be able to recover against the manufacturer and/or
distributor of the spray. See text accompanying notes 105-24 infra.
""RESTATE~IENT § 118.
"'There is no common law privilege to use force to prevent a minor misdemeanor. ld.
§ 140. There may be a privilege, however, to use force not likely or intended to cause serious
bodily harm to prevent an affray or similar breach of the peace. ld. § 141. The same is true of
riots, except that the actor may use force likely or intended to case serious bodily harm if the
riot itself threatens serious bodily harm. /d. § 142. The use of force likely or intended to cause
serious bodily harm also may be privileged when the actor is attempting to prevent a felony.
/d. § 143.
112
The test of the amount of force that may be used in effecting an arrest or recapture is what
the "actor reasonably believes necessary." /d. § 132. See generally Greenstone, Liability oj
Police Officers for Misuse of Their Weapons, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 396, 400-05 ( 1967).
In Chaudoin v. Fuller, a deputy sheriff, in the course of arresting plaintiff for disturbing the
peace, fired a tear gas gun into his face from a distance of three feet. The court held this to be
an unreasonable, unnecessary, and excessive use of force under the circumstances. 67 Ariz. 144,
192 P.2d 243 (1948).
x:tCivil Rights Act of 1871 § I, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
"'See Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L.
REV. 277 (1965). See also Ginger & Bell, Police Misconduct Litigation-Plaintiffs Remedies, in
15 A:11. JuR. TRIALS 555 (1968); Page, State Law and the Damages Remedy Under the Civil
Rights Act: Some Problems in Federalism, 43 DEN. L.J. 480 (1966). Two spray cases have been
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Negligence.
A person unintentionally injured as a direct or
indirect result of the use of chemical irritants may be able to recover
for negligence, if he can prove that the defendant handled the weapon
carelessly and that such substandard conduct was the legal cause of
the harm sustained.85 Several decisions involving tear gas guns shed
light on the way courts might deal with the issues of standard of care
and extent of liability in spray cases.
In Has/em v. Jackson, 86 plaintiff, a housemaid, was injured when a
tear gas gun designed to look like a fountain pen discharged as she
tried to tighten the cap. In an action against her employer, the owner
of the pen, the court held that since the gun was a "dangerous
instrumentality," defendant was under a duty to exercise a high
degree of care in possessing it, and that leaving it on a breakfast table
amounted to negligence as a matter of law.87
In Wall v. Zeeb, 88 however, it was held that the accidental
discharge of a tear gas gun while in the hands of a policeman does not
create in itself a presumption of negligence. The court added that such
a presumption, if available at all, applies only to cases involving
firearms and that the tear gas gun in question was not a "firearm"
because it could fire only tear gas cartridges, and not live bullets.89
This limitation on the term "firearm" seems to place nomenclature
above reason and allows the result to turn on a rather unrealistic
classification.
Other decisions have not been so restrictive. In Paul v. Holcomb, 90
the court saw no need to make a specific ruling on whether a tear gas
shell was a "dangerous instrumentality," since the standard of care is
almost invariably that of a reasonably prudent man under the
particular circumstances.91 Furthermore, the court found no error in
the trial judge's instruction allowing the jury to impose a duty of
brought under § 1983. Wright v. Ryan, No. C-1268 (D. Colo., Jan. 21, 1969); Lanier v.
District of Columbia, No. 2318-68 (D.D.C.. Sept. 13, 1968).
"'See generally Dillon v. Crowe, 406 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1969) (liability of private citizens); 4
PERSONAL INJURY: ACTIONS, DEFENSES, DA~IAGES 441-67 (l. Frumer, M. Friedman, l. Pilgrim,
L. Zuckerman, R. Hollweg eds. 1967) (liability of police officers) .
.. 68 Ohio App. 433, 40 N.E.2d 692 (1941).
"'ld. at 436-37, 40 N.E.2d at 693-94.
101 153 N.W.2d 779 (N.D. 1967).
"'Cf. note 163 infra and accompanying text.
90
8 Ariz. App. 22, 442 P.2d 559 (1968). In Paul, a tear gas shell exploded in defendant's
pocket as he sat down in plaintifrs restaurant. Plaintiff thought defendant's pants were on fire,
and tried to help by slapping at them. In so doing. the tear gas came in contact with her face,
causing serious injuries to her eyes. A jury verdict of $5,000 was affirmed, the court noting that
the plaintiff was foreseeably within the risk created.
91
/d. at 24, 442 P.2d at 561.
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exercising extreme caution if they found the shell to be a "dangerous
instrumentality.''
To date, only one reported case has dealt in depth with the
substantive issue of the standard of care in the operational use of tear
gas by the police. In Titcomb v. State, 92 the state of New York was
held liable for the negligence of state troopers who discharged a CN
tear gas grenade into a room in which decedent had barricaded
himself. Although the troopers eventually carried him from the room, he
died from lack of oxygen shortly thereafter. The court found the State
negligent in not giving the troopers adequate instructions about the
dangers of discharging CN grenades in enclosed spaces; it also found
the troopers negligent in using gas without having masks with them,
thus delaying the victim's rescue for critical minutes.93
The use of sprays by the police may create a further duty of care
when the individual officer is privileged to resort to force. It now
seems clear that victims of MACE require immediate treatment in
order to avoid the risk of serious injury from chemical irritants.9 ~ The
failure to provide such treatment, if it results in harm to the victim,
might amount to actionable negligence. 95 The duty to render first aid
would fall upon the officer using the spray or, if an arrest is made,
upon the officers in charge of the victim. To recover damages, the
victim would have to establish that the police officers knew or should
have known of the need for medical attention.
Federal Laboratories, the manufacturer of a CN aerosol, has
provided "wash-up cards" for issuance to spray victims by police.90
Whether the distribution of these cards obviates the duty to provide
medical treatment will depend upon the seriousness of the potential
injuries spray victims might incur. If a court should find that a risk
of permanent injury is involved, the cards probably would not shield
the police from liability. Furthermore, since a principal function of
such chemical weapons is to temporarily impair the recipient's vision,
' 2 30

Misc. 2d 902, 222 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
/d. at 911, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 605-06. For a discussion of the effect of sovereign immunity,
see notes 97-100 infra and accompanying text.
"See note 41 supra.
"In Chaudoin v. Fuller, a favorable verdict was awarded plaintiff who alleged that defendant
discharged a tear gas gun in his face from a distance of three feet, arrested him, and confined
him in a jail where there were no first aid facilities. 67 Ariz. 144, 192 P.2d 243 ( 1948). See also
Riley v. Rhay, 407 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1969); Hughes v. Noble, 295 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1961):
Coleman v. Johnston, 247 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1957) (suits brought under Civil Rights Act).
"These cards explain the cause of the stinging and tearing, that it is not dangerous, and how
to avoid skin irritation. Warning is also given to avoid applying oil or grease medication and
not to bandage. See Crockett, supra note 17, at 16.
03
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the cards would seem to be of limited value to individuals sprayed in
the face.
In addition to liability on the part of the law officer commiting
the tort, if the plaintiff can establish that the misuse of the spray was
within the scope of the tortfeasor's employment, he may be able to
hold the governmental unit employing him vicariously liable.97
Liability will depend upon how the courts in the particular jurisdiction
deal with the doctrine of sovereign immunity .98 Most jurisdictions,
while recognizing immunity with respect to municipalities, soften its
impact by distinguishing between proprietary and governmental
functions, imposing liability upon municipalities for torts committed
in the exercise of the former, but not the latter.99 The general rule has
been that police torts fall withm the latter, immune category, 100
although several jurisdictions have abolished the proprietarygovernmental distinction and hold municipalities vicariously liable for
the torts of individual policemen.101
Police department officials, however, may themselves be liable for
negligence when misuse of sprays results from inadequate training of
the officers who employ them, or when an officer who handles his
weapon in an intentionally brutal manner was hired or retained after
officials had notice, or should have had notice, of his unsuitably
sadistic nature. 102
Another theory of negligence that might be asserted against
executive governmental officials would be based upon an allegation of
negligence in the adoption of the sprays, because the chemical irritants
are unreasonably dangerous and create an unreasonable risk of harm
to anyone sprayed. A defense against such a claim, however, might be
that the officials performed the acts in the exercise of a discretionary
function and are therefore immune from liability. 103 Whether the
07
See generally \V. SEAVEY, LAw OF AGENCY § 89, at 156-58 (1964). Senior police officers
are not, however, vicariously liable ror the torts or their men. See Note, The Tort Liability of
Public Officers for the Acts of Their Subordinates, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 505-08.
18
See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 70, § 125.
"'See 2 C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW§ 11.07 (1968).
100See id. § 11.11; 18 E. McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.51 (3d ed. rev.
1963); Mathes & Jones, Toward a ··scope of Official Duty" Immunity for Police Officers in
Damage Actions, 53 GEO. L.J. 889 (1965). Cases involving tear gas have rollowed the general
rule. Hagedorn v. Schrum, 226 Iowa 128, 283 N.W. 876 (1939); Luvaul v. City or Eagle Pass,
408 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
101 See Shapo, Municipal Liability for Police Torts: An Analysis of a Strand of American
Legal History, 17 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475 (1963).
unsee Greenstone, supra note 82, at 410-11.
103
See id. at 408-10; SA PERSONAL INJURY, supra note 85, at 201; Jarre, Suits Against
Govemments and Officers-Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209, 218-25 (1963); Note, The
Tort Liability of Public Officers. supra note 97, at 508-10.

1254

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:1238

municipality could be held liable would depend again upon the
particular jurisdiction's interpretation of the scope of sovereign
immunity. 10 ~

LIABILITY OF THE MANUFACTURER

The manufacturers of chemical sprays may be liable under several
different theories. When the user is injured by the spray itself because
of a leaking canister, accidental discharge, or blowback of the
chemical droplets, he should be able to recover under one or more of
several theories: negligent construction105 or design106 of the weapon,
failure to warn of the hazard which produced the injury, 107 breach of
implied108 or express warranty/ 09 and strict tort liability .110
The various negligence theories offer no conceptual difficulties.
Negligent construction suggests that a particular weapon contained a
faulty delivery mechanism, a flaw in the composition of the liquid, or
some such deviation from the manufacturer's own specifications.
Negligent design suggests that the delivery mechanism, composition of
the liquid, or other such feature, though meeting the manufacturer's
specifications, nevertheless created an unreasonable risk of harm. The
adequacy of a warning or of instructions for use will depend upon
what the manufacturer knew, or should have known, about his
product and the potential dangers it posed. 111 Federal labeling
requirements, if applicable, will be relevant in determining the
adequacy of the warning on the label. 112
•••See notes 99-100 supra and accompanying text.
1
o:;See genera/(1' I L. FRU~IER & M. FRIED~IAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 (1968) (hereinafter
cited as L. FRU~IER & M. FRIED~IAN].
•••See generally id. § 7; Noel, Manufacturer's 1\'eg/igence of Design or Directions jar l.'st• oj
a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816 (1962).
107See generally. I L. FRU~IER & M. FRIEmiAN § 8; Noel, supra note I 06.
""'See2 L. FRmtER& M. FRIED~IAN § 16.04(2].
10
'See id. § 16.04[4].
""See id. § 16A; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
111 1n Scurjield v. Federal Laboraties. Inc., the defendant-manufacturer was held to have
discharged his duty to warn by informing the purchaser of a tear gas gun of its nature and
purpose. Thus, even though defendant's salesman had stated to the purchaser that the weapon
could not cause serious harm, defendant was not liable to a visitor of the purchaser who thought
the weapon was a fountain pen, picked it up, and discharged it in his own face. 335 Pa. 145, 6
A.2d 559 (1939).
112
See text accompanying notes 150-51 infra. Failure to comply with an applicable federal
standard would be evidence of negligence, or perhaps even negligence per se. Set• Morris, Tht•
Role of Administrative Safety Measures in .Vegligence Actions, 28 TEXAS L. REV. 143 (1949);
Comment, Products Liability Based upon the Violation of Statutory Standards, 64 MICU. L.
REV. 1388 (1966).
When the manufacturer has complied with safety standards, such compliance constitutes
evidence of due care; however, plaintiff should be allowed to introduce evidence to show that
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Recovery by the User.
If the user sustains harm because the
weapon failed to function properly at a critical moment, thus ·enabling
an assailant to inflict injury, he may be able to recover under the
theories mentioned above, provided he can prove that the
malfunctioning of the weapon was the proximate cause of the injuries
suffered. If a person is injured as a result of his own possession or use
of a spray which he bought at a public sale, and he seeks to recover
from the manufacturer on a duty-to-warn theory, the manufacturer's
compliance, or lack thereof, with applicable federal labeling
requirements will be relevant on the issue of negligence.
Recovery by the Victim.
When plaintiff is the spray victim, either
the user's intended target or an innocent bystander, the liability of the
manufacturer will depend upon a combination of the following
factors: (I) the manufacturer's conduct and/ or the qualitative nature
of his product; (2) the seriousness of the plaintiff's injuries; and (3)
the conduct of the user-whether he acted in a substandard manner,
whether he intended to spray the victim, and, in the latter case,
whether he was privileged to do so.
The injured spray victim who wishes to assert the theories of
warranty or strict liability must face the initial difficulty of
establishing that these theories are available to him. The 1951 version
of section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code limited the seller's
warranty to "any natural person who is in the family or household of
his buyer or who is a guest in his home. " 113 This section has now been
amended to offer three alternative paragraphs, 114 two of which would
extend coverage to anyone "who may be reasonably expected to use,
consume, or be affected by the goods. " 115 The spray victim, both the
intended target and the innocent bystander, clearly would be able to
assert a claim for breach of warranty under either of these two
alternatives.
defendant should have taken additional precautions. Hubbard-Hall Chern. Co. v. Silverman, 340
l· ..:!d -102 (1st Cir. 1965) . .";e,• W. PROSSER. supra note 70. § 35. at 205: Morris. \ltflra. at 15766.
113
UNtfOR~I Co~t~IERCIAL CODE § 2-318. The drafters, however, made it clear that their
position was neutral with respect to further extensions of the seller's warranties. !d., Comment
3. Nevertheless, decisions have allowed injured bystanders to recover from the manufacturer
under the implied warranty theory. See. e.g.• Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85,
133 N.W.2d 129 (1965); Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp. 198, 188 A.2d 884·(Hartford
County Super. Ct. 1963).
'"U:-;tFOR~I Co~t~tF.RCIAL Com:§ 2-318, Alternatives A. B. C.
.Ufd. § 2-318, Alternatives B. C (emphasis added). Alternative A continues to limit recovery
to the family, household, and guests of the buyer. See J. HoNNOLD, LAW OF SALES AND
SALES FtSANCISG, 150-52 (3d ed. 1968).
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Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts allows the
"user or consumer" of a product to assert a claim for strict tort
liability, 116 but takes no position on whether protection should be
extended to persons other than users or consumers. 117 A recent
decision by the California Supreme Court may mark the beginning of
a trend to permit bystanders to take advantage of the strict liability
theory .U8 A fortiori, the intended victim also should be allowed to use
the theory, since his relation to the product and its use is more
intimate than that of a mere bystander. The suggested amendments to
the Uniform Commercial Code provide further support for the
argument that the target ought to be able to assert the theory of strict
liability .119 Finally, it may be urged that the target is in fact a
consumer, albeit an involuntary one, since the intended use of the
product entails the inhalation of gases given off by the spray. The fact
that the spray was designed to produce noxious results should make
no difference if the injury sustained by the target exceeded the type
and scope of harm the weapon was supposed to inflict.
If the spray victim is able to utilize either the warranty or strict
liability theory, he must still establish that the product was
defective. 120 The test under both theories probably would be whether
the product is unreasonably dangerous.121 There are several ways in
which a plaintiff may argue that a chemical spray should be so
classified. He may point to a construction or design defect in the
weapon;122 he may claim that the known dangers created by the
spray are beyond the limits that should be tolerated for law
enforcement .or self-defense purposes;123 or he may allege that a failure
to give proper operating instructions and a sufficient warning of the
hazards attendant the weapon's use render it unreasonably dangerous,
and hence defectiveP~ As a practical matter, in most instances proof
supra note 70, § 402A.
comment o.
""Elmore v. American Motors Corp.,_ Cal. 2d _ , 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652
(1969).
"'See notes 114-115 supra and accompanying text.
""The accidental discharge of a tear gas gun has been held not sufficient in itself to prove the
existence of a defect. Gaw v. Lake Erie Chern. Co., 293 Ill. App. 123, II N.E.2d 982 (1937).
mRESTATE~IENT § 402A, comment i.
122
See generally Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does a Product Have to Be?, 42
IND. L.J. 301 (1967); Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement
of a Defect, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 855 (1963); Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations
About Allocation of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1329 (1966).
•nsee RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment i. Any decision on the merits of this issue would
involve interesting policy considerations on police weaponry and the domestic arms race.
'"ld. § 402A, commentj.
110 RESTATEMENT,

111

/d., Caveat

&

1969]

MACE

1257

of unreasonable danger under any theory would also amount. to proof
of negligence.
Relationship of Injury and Recovery.
The possible injuries which
a chemical spray may inflict fall into three categories: transitorily
disabling, prolonged, such as second-degree burns which eventually
heal or impaired vision which eventually clears, and permanent. Any
of these injuries would be sufficient to satisfy the required element of
damage;125 however, if the intended target of the user sustains nothing
more than transitorily disabling effects from a spray, the
manufacturer should not be held liable, since the sprays are intended
and designed to cause such harm.126 Furthermore, it may be that a
court would require proof of permanent injuries before it ruled, as a
matter of law, that a spray was defective because of its
ultrahazardous nature.127
Conduct of the User.
If the user acted with due care, but sprayed
an onlooker, even under circumstances which would constitute an
unavoidable accident, the victim. nevertheless should be able to recover
from the manufacturer upon satisfaction of the elements required by
the aforementioned theories. 128 When the user carelessly sprays a
bystander and the injuries sustained derive from negligent or defective
construction or design of the spray, the bystander should still be able
to recover from the manufacturer under a theory of negligence,
implied warranty, or strict liability. The user's intervening negligence
or faulty marksmanship should not constitute misuse of the product
such as to absolve the manufacturer of liability;129 such negligence is
reasonably foreseeable, and should not insulate the manufacturer. 130 If,
however, the user's negligence is attributable to his failure to follow
I:SSee \V. PROSSER § 30 (negligence); RESTATEMENT § 402A (strict tort liability); UNIFORM
Co~IMERCIAL

CODE § 2-314, comment 13 (warranty).

•z•see note 26 supra. If the spray does what it is supposed to do, it is difficult to conceive
how there can be any defect in the product or negligence on the part of the manufacturer. A
bystander, however, who suffers such harm because a defect in the discharge mechanism caused
a burst of liquid to go awry might well be able to recover against the manufacturer.
msee note 123 supra.
1""'See text accompanying notes 105-110 supra.
no In cases asserting a theory of negligence, the manufacturer will be liable for harm
sustained during the "normal use" of his product and will not be liable if injuries result "only
because it is mishandled in a way which he has no reason to expect, or is used in some unusual
and unforeseeable manner." RESTATE~!ENT § 395, comment j at 330. Comments g and h
of § 402A limit strict tort liability to cases of "normal handling."
• 30 Cf. Warner v. Santa Catalina Island Co., 44 Cal. 2d 310, 282 P.2d 12 (1955). Plaintiff
was injured by the ricochet of a defective cartridge fired in a shooting gallery. The court held
that continued use of defective shells by the gallery operator, despite knowledge of the defect,
should have been foreseeable by the manufacturer.
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instructions in the handling of the weapon, the manufacturer at least
cannot be at fault for failure to warn. As a practical matter, under
these facts plaintiff would seem assured of recovery from either the
manufacturer or the user, for it is clear that either the manufacturer
failed to give proper warnings or instructions, or, if they were given,
the user failed to heed them.
When the plaintiff is the intended target and suffers more than
transitorily disabling harm as a result of a construction or design
defect in the spray or inadequate warnings and instructions in its use,
he should clearly be able to recover from the manufacturer in
situations in which the injuries are of a more serious nature than the
user intended or would have been privileged to inflict. Whether or not
the user had a privilege to use force should be irrelevant to the
manufacturer's liability, since any firing of the weapon should have
been foreseen as normal use. If the user had no privilege he would be
liable jointly with the manufacturer. If the user knows that a spray
can cause more than transitorily disabling injuries if fired in a certain
manner, and he still discharges the weapon in that manner, the
victim's injuries cannot be attributed to any failure to warn on the
part of the manufacturer.131 A finding that such a user of a spray lost
his privilege by employing excessive force would seem to carry with it
a finding that he knew what he was doing; hence the manufacturer
could not be charged with a failure to warn.
LIABILITY OF THE RETAILER AND WHOLESALER

The retailer of a spray sold to the public or to the police also
might be liable, based on a negligent failure to warn of the spray's
known dangers, 1=12 breach of implied warranty of merchantability, 133 or
13 • An interesting problem might arise in the unlikely event that the user intended to cause
transitorily disabling harm, but under the circumstances would have been privileged to inflict
serious bodily injury and in fact did inflict such injury because of a defect in the construction or
design of the weapon or in the instructions for its use. If the user would have nonetheless fired
the weapon with knowledge of the defect and if the victim intentionally created the situation
which gave rise to the privilege, then it is highly improbable that a court would allow the victim
to recover against the manufacturer. If, however, he could prove that the user, although
privileged to discharge the spray with knowledge of the defect, would not have done so, a court
might be persuaded to hold the manufacturer liable. The victim's case would be even stronger if
the privilege arose from the user·s reasonable but mistaken belief that he was threatened with
serious bodily harm.
The assumption here is that a court would place upon the manufacturer no higher duty than
that of warning about the possibility of injury from certain uses or misuses of the weapon. Any
higher duty suggests that the weapon as manufactun:d is defective because of its ultrahazardous
nature. See text accompanying note 121 supra.
1"See 2 L. rRU~!ER & M. rRIED~IAS. supra note 103, § 18.02.
133See 2 id. § 19.03[3]; UNtFOR~I CmntERCIAL CODE § 2-314.
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strict liability.134 Furthermore, a retailer may be liable for negligence
in selling a spray to a person he knows or should know may create
an unreasonable risk of harm in his handling of the weapon.135 The
purchaser of the spray might also have the additional remedies of
breach of express warrantyt 36 or breach of implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose.137 A wholesaler who sells sprays to salesmen
for resale to the general public likewise might be liable under any of
these theories, 138 except possibly breach of implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose.139 Attempts by the manufacturer or seller to
avoid liability by means of disclaimers printed on the canister or on
separate documents will doubtless be treated with the same disfavor
courts have generally evidenced toward disclaimers on consumer
products.uo
REGULATION OF CHEMICAL SPRAYS

Any examination of the use of tort law as a means of achieving
societal control over chemical sprays should also touch briefly upon
the potential of other aspects of the legal process. Police misuse of
sprays may be criminal as well as tortious, although resort to
criminal prosecution has not proved an effective method of controlling
police activity .141 The same generally has been true of resort to
administrative procedures designed to handle civilian grievances
against the police.142
"'See 2 l. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN § 16A; RESTATEMENT § 402A.
135 Cf. 2 l. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN §§ 18.04A, .05; 3 R. HURSH, AMERICAN LAW OF
PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 26:18, :22 (1961). The manufacturer of PREVENTOR I requires the
purchaser to sign a pledge that he will use the chemical spray only for defensive purposes. N.Y.
Times, May 6, 1969, at 82, col. I.
'"'See 2 l. FRU~IER & M. FRIED~IAN § 19.04; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 2-313.
137
See 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIED~IAN § 19.03[4]; UNIFOR~t CoM~IERCIAL CoDE§ 2-315.
1
"'See 2 l. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN § 20.
130 This warranty would seem to arise only out of dealings between the seller and the
purchaser. See authorities cited note 137 supra.
uosee 2 l. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN§ 19.07.
!USee P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER: POLICE ABUSES IN New YORK CITY 250-52 (1969);
Edwards, Criminal Liability for Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 41 VA. L. Rev. 621
(1955); Comment, Kill or Be Killed?: Use of Deadly Force in the Riot Situation, 56 CALIF. L.
Rev. 829, 855-56 (1968).
112See Ginger & Bell, supra note 84, §. 6, at 555; Note, The Administration of Complaints by
Civilians Against the Police, 77 HARV. L. Rev. 499 (1964).
A recent example of the questionable efficacy of such procedures is a San Francisco police
report clearing a member of the city's Tactical Squad. He had sprayed a 23 year-old girl who
was handcuffed and allegedly trying to get out of the patrol wagon where her mother and sister
were also being held. San Francisco Chronicle, Apr. I, 1969, at I, col. I. The women, respected
members of the black community, had been arrested at the scene of a traffic accident for failing
to obey police orders. The report did call the use of MACE "questionable," and the officer in
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INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

There are other possible approaches to the problem, however, one
of which is a class action to enjoin police departments from issuing or
using sprays, at least in the absence of full instructions about their
dangerous propensities.t 43 Two such suits have already been ·filed
under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 144 one resulting in a
consent decree whereby police officials have agreed: (l) to restrict the
use of MACE to situations in which a blackjack or nightstick would
be justified; (2) to refrain from using MACE on crowds ''unless there
is a clear and present danger of a riot or an affray," in which case
only after giving adequate warning; and (3) to insure that spray
victims receive proper first aid as soon as possible.145
An injunction also may be appropriate relief against repeated
misuse of sprays by police. Although such relief has not been granted
to date in a spray case, it has been allowed in other instances of police
abuse of authority. In Lankford v. Gelston,146 an injunction was issued
forbidding illegal searches. More recently, in the aftermath of the
question was transferred from the Tactical Squad, yet it is not surprising that the San Francisco
NAACP branded the report as a "cover-up and whitewash." /d.
113
See Ginger ~ Bell, supra note 84, at §§ 9, 43; Comment, The Federal Injunction as a
Remedy for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143 (1968).
tuSee note 84 supra.
•••Bethea v. Monaghan, Civil No. 68-2529 (E.D. Pa., Mar. 12, 1969). Information about the
consent decree was obtained in a telephone interview with Daniel Shertzer of Lancaster, Pa.,
counsel for plaintiffs. The other class suits are still in the pleading stages. One seeks relief
against the uncontrolled, uninformed, and indiscriminate use of sprays, alleging that such use
violates rights secured by the fifth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments. Lanier v. District of
Columbia, No. 2318-68 (D.D.C., Sept. 13, 1968). The other asks for broad relief against a wide
range of alleged police misconduct, citing police misuse of MACE as but one example of illegal
activity utilized to deprive New Haven blacks of their constitutional rights of free speech,
assembly, association, petition, movement and privacy, and freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures. Harris v. Lee, No. 12459 (D. Conn., filed Mar. 12, 1968).
A similar suit, filed by prisoners in the Virginia State Penitentiary, resulted in a temporary
order restraining prison officials from "the use of tear gas or deleterious chemicals against any
individual inmate except in the most extraordinary circumstances and after approval in writing
of the superintendent . . . . " Mason v. Peyton, No. 5611-R (E. D. Va. Aug. 13, 1968),
UG364 F.2d 197 {4th Cir. 1966), noted in 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 104. Plaintiffs' homes had been
searched by the Baltimore police without warrants. Similar searches had been conducted in a
black neighborhood over a 19 day period, pursuant to a plan designed to apprehend Negro
suspects in a robbery in which several policemen were shot. Although the searches were confined
to the 19 day period and the police commissioner had since issued an order forbidding them, the
Fourth Circuit issued an injunction under § 1983. The court emphasized the morale-boosting
function of such an injunction, which would be an effective gesture demonstrating the law's
concern for ghetto injustices. Noting that money damages would be inadequate and not an
effective deterrent to police misconduct, the court found that the police had suspended the
searches not because they were illegal, but because they were ineffective, and therefore the issue
raised was not moot. 364 F.2d at 202-03.
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1968 Democratic National Convention, an injunction was found
appropriate to prohibit police from interfering with news
photographers.147
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL

Federal legislation at present does not provide adequate safeguards
for the production, sale, or use of chemical sprays. Moreover,
administrative action has been laggard. Although the Justice
Department, the Surgeon General, and the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) have all taken tentative steps toward
examining the effects of MACE as a police weapon, they have
hesitated because of jurisdictional uncertainties.148 In addition, the
Surgeon General and the FDA have displayed a considerable lack of
coordination in dealing with the available data on the dangers of
MACE. 149 Nevertheless, some regulatory power exists, which
potentially could serve as a basis to control chemical sprays.
The Federal Hazardous Substances Act places certain labeling
requirements on products intended for household use. Furthermore, if
a product is deemed so dangerous that ''protection of the public
health and safety can be adequately served only by keeping such
substance . . . out of the channels of interstate commerce," it may
even be banned.150 Since one of the adyertised purposes of the sprays
is defense of the home,151 these weapons clearly fall within the ambit
of the Act.
A basic weakness of the Act, however; is that the Government
117 Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969). See generally WALKER REPORT,
supra note 53.
145 See statement by Dr. James L. Goddard before the Subcomm. on Executive
Reorganization of the Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, Apr. 17, 1969.
"'To illustrate, on April 9, 1968, the Army notified the Surgeon General that MACE had
failed to meet its safety requirements and furnished the data upon which this decision was based.
See Letter of Brig. Gen. Donald D. Blackburn, supra note 43. The Surgeon General, however,
made no mention of this tn his warning letter of May 2, 1968. Letter from the Surgeon General,
supra note 35. Dr. Herbert L. Ley, Jr., the Commissioner of the FDA, later asserted that he did
not learn of the Army's conclusion that MACE was unsafe until April 23, 1969, although he
stated that he was aware of the Army's tests: See Office of Senator Frank E. Moss, News
Release, June 2, 1969.
•~15 U.S.C. § 1263 (Supp. IV, 1965-68), amending 15 U.S.C. § 1263 (1964). A hazardous
substance is that which, inter alia, is corrosive or is an irritant and which foreseeably may cause
substantial personal injury. 15 U.S.C. § 126l(f)(I)(A) (1964). A corrosive is that which causes
destruction of tissue by chemical action. 15 U.S.C. 1261(i) (1964). An irritant induces a local
inflammatory reaction after prolonged or repeated contact with normal tissue. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1261G) (1964).
msee, e.g., SALESMAN's OPPORTUNITY, Apr. 1969, at 23 (ad for ON GUARD); SPECIALTY
SALESMAN, Sept. 1968, at 29 (ad for PROTECTOR).
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must prove that a product is mislabeled or ultrahazardous. This
means that enforcement will depend upon the initiative of the FDA,
the federal agency which administers the Act. To date, the FDA has
recommended the type of labeling which should be placed on the
sprays and has made two seizures of spray weapons.152 Yet the claim
by Smith & Wesson's president, William G. Gunn, that another spray
composed of a mustard gas derivative has been on sale to the public
suggests that the FDA may not be doing enough.153 One solution
would be legislation requiring pre-marketing clearance by the FDA
before an aerosol chemical weapon may be sold to the public. 15 ~
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) also could be a source of
regulation, since it has authority to take action against deceptive
practices in interstate commerce.155 The FTC therefore has the power
to investigate spray advertising in order to ascertain whether any of
the claims made are so misleading as to justify the issuance of cease
and desist orders. 156 The Department of Agriculture likewise has
relevant regulatory powers. The Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act requires the seller of substances used to repel animals
to register with the Department and enables the Department to
regulate the sale of such substances. 157 This authority could be utilized
to control the few spray weapons which are advertised as dog
repellants.
The Post Office Department also has power to act, since it can
ban the mailing of "chemical . . . devices . . . which may ignite or
explode . . . and all other . . . material which may kill or injure
another, or injure the mails or other property . . . . " 158 The
Department has exercised this authority by barring CN sprays from
shipment through the mails. 159 Distributors, however, have easily
sidestepped this restriction by employing other methods of shipment.1 60
Finally, several jurisdictions have statutes making it a crime for
Consumer Hearings. supra note 18 (statement of Dr. Herbert L. Ley, Jr.).
Consumer Hearings (statement of William G. Gunn).
"'Such a requirement would be analogous to the burden placed upon the manufacturers of
new drugs. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1964).
155
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964). See generally Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1005 (1967).
"•For an expression of the FTC's intent to examine spray advertising, see Consumer
Hearings (statement of Paul Rand Dixon).
157
7 u.s.c. §§ 135-35k (1964).
158
18 u.s.c. § 1716 (1964).
159
Telephone interview with Post Office Department official, in Washington, D.C., May 16,
1969. See also Wall Street Journal, supra note 18.
100
A published advertisement for BODY GUARD states: "Sending tear gas thru the Mail is
illegal-we ship this . . . via Express." See, e.g., SPECIALTY SALESMAN, Sept. 1968, at 66.
152

153
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private citizens to possess, carry, or sell tear gas weapons, and/ or
requiring licenses for such activities.161 Moreover, a number of states
have enacted legislation regulating the possession of deadly or
concealed weapons. 162 Some court decisions, however, have
distinguished between tear gas guns which can also fire live
ammunition and tear gas weapons which discharge only a gas or
spray, finding the latter outside the statutes.163 No state to date has
enacted legislation dealing directly with aerosol sprays. 16 ~
REALITY OF RELIEF

The foregoing discussion of tort law and chemical sprays has
examined the factual bases for personal injury litigation, the
applicable tort theories, and various other legal approaches to the
problem. There remains for considerati9n the practical factors which
may affect both the outcome of damage suits and their impact upon
the production, sale, and use of these weapons.
A recent article on the control of police behavior argues that "a
civil action against a police officer is perhaps least satisfactory, both
as a means of seeking redress and as a means for positively
influencing police conduct. " 165 To what degree does this observation
161
In twelve jurisdictions, the statutory provisions seem broad enough to regulate sprays.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-4518 (1964); CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 12400-35 (West 1956), as amended,
(West Supp. 1968); HAWAII REV. STAT.§§ 13"4-1 to -15 (1968); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 24-1
(1964); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 732.10-.14 (1950); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.224 (1969);
Nev. REv. STAT. §§ 202.370-.380 (1963); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:I44-l, :151-60 (1953); N.C.
GeN. STAT. § 14.401.6 (1953); WASH. Rev. CODE ANN. § 70.74.310 (1962); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 164.20 (1957); N.Y. CITY AD~IIN. CODE § 436-5.0(e) (Supp. 1969). In other jurisdictions,
only tear gas bombs are prohibited and the wording of the statutes is probably too narrow to
include sprays. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-2453-54 (Supp. 1965). See also S.C. CODE
ANN.§ 16-147 (1962) (limited to tear gas guns); PA. STAT. ANN.§§ 3861-62 (1963) (limited to
use ~ftear gas against persons involved in labor disputes); VA. CODE ANN.§ 6618.1-70 (Supp.
1968) (use of tear gas prohibited except in self-defense and defense of property).
162
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-206 (1960); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4706 (Supp.
1968); N.H. Rev. STAT. ANN.§ 159:4 (Supp. 1967); N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 2A:I51-19, -31, -41
(1953), as amended, (Supp. 1968); N.Y. PENAL LAW ANN.§ 265.05 (McKinney, 1967); W.VA.
CODE ANN.§ 61-7-1 (1966).
103See, e.g., State v. Umbrello, 106 N.H. 336, 211 A.2d 400 (1965); People v. Anderson, 236
App. Div. 586, 260 N.Y.S. 329 (1932); Village of Barboursville ex rei. Bates v. Taylor, 115 W.
Va. 4, 174 S.E. 485 (1934). See also United States v. Decker, 292 F.2d 89 (6th Cir. 1961) (tear
gas gun capable of firing shotgun shell is firearm within meaning of National Firearms Act);
State v. Seng, 91 N.J. Super. 50, 219 A.2d 185 (App. Div. 1966) (whether tear gas gun is
firearm is question of fact).
161 For an account of an unsuccessful attempt to pass such legislation in Indiana, see the
Indianapolis Star, Feb. 16, 1969, at I, col. 4.
165
Goldstein, Administrative Problems in Controlling the Exercise of Police Authority, 58 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 160, 168 (1967).
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bear on MACE cases? Spray victims of course will face the usual
obstacles that confront any attempted recovery against police officers.
Because such suits amount to an attack on the law enforcement
establishment, they will be defended vigorously.166 "Juries are not
likely to have compassion for a plaintiff, however abused, if he is
guilty of a crime or disreputable. " 167 Judges may reflect the same
attitudes. Furthermore, spray cases involving demonstrators may have
political overtones, thus perhaps prejudicing the resolution of
questions such as whether excessive force was applied or whether the
use of the spray created an unreasonable risk of harm. If plaintiff
manifests political views that are repugnant to the court or the jury,
the police officer's privilege to use force likely will be construed
liberally. Popular attitudes favoring the police violence at the 1968
Democratic Convention in Chicago suggest support for this
proposition.168
A related consideration is that valid claims often may not be
asserted. Although spray injuries include pain, discomfort, burns, and
impairment of vision, few involve permanent harm. In most cases,
therefore, special damages may be rather modest. Furthermore, a law
suit, particularly one based on products liability, would not be easy
and might prove expensive. Consequently, the likely litigation costs,
when weighed against the possibility and amount of a favorable
y,erdict, may discourage victims from asserting claims and attorneys
from accepting such cases. This could be a critical problem i'n spray
incidents which occur at a considerable distance from the
manufacturer and from doctors or scientists who might be willing to
testify for the plaintiff.169 One possible solution to the problem is for
attorneys with claims against one particular manufacturer to pool
1"/d.
U1Jd. One of the pending cases involves an Indian who was drunk at the time he was
sprayed. Miguel v. Hinderliter, No. C217921 (Ariz. Super. Ct., filed Nov. 22, 1968). The
plaintiff in one potential MACE case has been described as "a somewhat unattractive person,
. . . serving a jail term in another county." Letter from his attorney, Apr. 29, 1969, on file with
author. Another potential spray plaintiff has been described as "a contentious individual •..
[who] may well have a psychological deficit stemming from the time of his birth." Letter from
his attorney, Dec. 4, 1968, on. file with author.
1 ~Gallup, Majority Back Chicago Police, LAW OFFICER, Fall, 1968, at 23; cf. OPHTHALMIC
OBSERVER, Feb. 1969,-at 3 (487 of 604 opthalmologists polled favored use of MACE by police);
N.Y. Times, Dec. I, 1968, at 40, col. I (students and faculty at Duquesne University voted
I, I 13 to 192 in favor of keeping MACE on campus).
IGIThis factor was cited by a Georgia attorney as the principal obstacle to the filing of a
number of claims by Negroes who had been sprayed by police. Lettl!r to author, from. John D.
Mattox, Dec. 14, 1968.
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their talents and information.l7° As yet no such cooperative effort has
been attempted.
In addition to the problem of expense, ghetto dwellers or
individuals not within the mainstream of society may have such a
distrust of the legal process that they are unwilling to submit
themselves to the demands of trial preparation and actual litigation.171
This attitude may extend even to the middle class, in which a
reluctance to "get involved" may inhibit recourse to the courts.172
Another deterrent is the possibility that the institution of a damage
suit might provoke the filing of criminal charges against the plaintiff,
if such charges had not already been brought.
Besides the fact that damage suits against policemen are difficult to
win, and that individuals with valid claims do not bring them, a further
drawback is the unlikelihood that a verdict for plaintiff will achieve
any positive results. As Judge Sobeloff, in holding that the plaintiffs
in Lankford had no adequate remedy at law, explained:
There can be little doubt that actions for money damages would not
suffice to repair the injury suffered by the victims of the police
searches. Neither the personal assets of policemen nor the nominal
bonds they furnish afford genuine hope of redress. . . . Moreover,
the lesson of experience is that the remote possibility of money
damages serves as no deterrent to future police invasions.173

This observation would seem equally applicable to the misuse of
chemical sprays.
Furthermore, the extent to which tort recoveries can affect the
manufacturers and distributors of sprays is uncertain. The chemical
weapons business is quite profitable. 174 If the manufacturers and
110See generally Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster
Litigation, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 116 (1968).
171 Attorneys in Washngton, D.C., have told the author of two promising spray cases which
were never pursued for these reasons. A potential spray plaintiff on the west coast has been
described as having "little more patience with the processes of law in a personal injury case thari
he does with th~ activity of the local police departments." Letter from his attorney, Dec. 4,
1968, on file with author. One of the pending spray cases may have to be dropped because of
lack of cooperation by plaintiff. Telephone interview with attorney for plaintiff, Apr. 1969.
"The poor man thinks of the policeman as someone who pushes him around, and the lawyer
is always the man who takes something away from him." Address by Mr. Justice Thurgood
Marshall, 18th Annual Conference of Judges and Lawyers of the 7th Federal Circuit Court
District, May 9, 1969, in CRIME CONTROL DIGEST, May 22, 1969, at II.
17
zAttorneys in San Francisco cited these reasons to the author to explain why a minister and
a Negro middle class family did not bring lawsuits to vindicate seemingly valid claims against
the police for the misuse of MACE.
173 Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 202 (4th Cir. 1966). See also Wildstrom, Mugged by
the Sheriffs: An Anecdote, NATION, Apr. 21, 1969, at 496.
msee Wall Street Journal, supra note 18.
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sellers carry product liability insurance,175 they may be able to pass
the costs of damage suits to the consumer by adjusting the price of
the product to reflect any increase in their insurance premiums.
Does the conclusion therefore follow that tort law has no role to
play in the effort to achieve meaningful control over the possession,
sale, and use of chemical sprays? Several positive factors suggest that
it may be premature to dismiss its potential. First, it is by no means
certain that spray victims have little hope of recovery. Plaintiffs in
some of the spray cases already filed are far from disreputable.l7°
Also, the presence of the manufacturer as a defendant along with the
police or the municipality can put the plaintiff in the advantageous
position of pleading his case in such a way that one defendant or the
other must be liable.177
The impact which the filing of one damage suit in the District of
Columbia has already had is noteworthy. After a claim was brought
against several policemen and the District, the D.C. Department of
Public Health was requested to conduct research on the spray weapon
involved.178 Though finding no evidence of any risk of eye injury, the
study revealed that the inhalation of large quantities of vapors from
the spray could cause lung and kidney damage. 179 Unfortunately, the
Department has seen fit to suppress the study.
The threat of potential damage suits also had an interesting
impact in San Francisco, where the City and County Charter forbids
the elected Board of Supervisors to interfere in administrative
affairs,t 80 which include police matters. Members of the Board
disGussed the possibility that damage suits against the City and
County arising from police misuse of sprays might deplete the public
treasury. Citing this as justification they passed a resolution calling
upon the police department to suspend the use of sprays until the
175 1n an interesting case it was held that the premises-liability insurance of a seller of tear gas
devices did not extend to the defense and settlement of a claim arising from the illegal sale of
such a device to a minor. Hagen Supply Corp. v. Iowa Nat'! Mut. Ins. Co., 33 I F.2d 199 (8th
Cir. 1964).
176 Jennings v. City of Winter Park, Civil No. 68-4047 (Fla. Cir. Ct., filed Sept. 6, 1968)
(plaintiff is a 68 year-old attorney and past president of a county bar association); Vaughn v.
City of Estacade, No. 342266, (Ore. Cir. Ct., filed Oct. 2, 1968) (plaintiff was an infant less
than a year old when sprayed).
111
See p. 1258 supra.
118
See Washington Evening Star, Feb. 24, 1969, § B. at 4, col. I; Washington Post, Feb. 23,
1969, § A, at 21, col. I.
119
Washington Post, supra note 178.
'""City & County of San Francisco, Charter, § 22 (1932).
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Board of Health could study the weapons and assess the dangers they
posed.181
Moreover, publicity emanating from tort litigation may bestir
police departments to reevaluate their policy on sprays. The wide
press coverage given the Surgeon General's letter resulted in the
suspension of the use of sprays by a number of departments
throughout the countryt 82-a reaction which reflects the role of public
relations in law enforcement and suggests what the stimulus of
adverse publicity can do. Further focus on the dangers of sprays by the
mass media can drive home at least the necessity of careful and
controlled use of the weapons and the need for prompt treatment of
victims.
Another positive aspect of damage suits is that they may provide
significant data on the issue of whether and to what extent the sprays
can cause permanent damage. Indeed, in a sense one may look upon
the spray victim-plaintiffs as subjects of a nationwide experiment in
the use of chemical aerosols in law enforcement.
CONCLUSION

The hazards created by the public sale of chemical sprays may be
said to constitute a consumer protection problem and hence raise
issues which are politically popular and "safe" for legislators and
administrators. Existing state and federal laws provide a basis for the
exercise of some degree of regulation over these weapons. Additional
federal legislation may be forthcoming. 183 The use of sprays by the
police presents a considerably more difficult problem. There are no
laws regulating the manufacture or use of police sprays, and the
present delicacy of the "law-and-order" issue militates against the
passage of such legislation.
This leaves the courts as a final barrier to the unfettered
production and use of chemical sprays for law enforcement. The
judicial process has the capability to provide a forum both for the
dispassionate resolution of the factual issues which underlie the
MACE controversy and for the imposition of rational public
restraints upon the manufacture and use of these weapons. The
substantive rules to be applied in damage actions and suits for
equitable relief provide an adequate means of achieving these results.
181
lnterview with Terry A. Francois, Esq., Member, Board of Supervisors, City and County
of San Francisco, Cal., in San Francisco, Apr. 9, 1969.
102
See CRIME CONTROL DIGEST, May 22, 1968, at 10; NEWSWEEK, June 10, 1968, at 79;
TIME, May 17, 1968, at 52.
...See Office of Senator Frank E. Moss, supra note 149.
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How judges and jurors will apply these rules is the crucial question.
Whether the courts will accept the challenge and the extent to which
the judicial process can regulate the utilization of chemical warfare
technology by domestic law enforcement agencies will reflect to a
significant degree the law's role and relevance in dealing with the
pressures which are presently straining at the seams of the American
social fabric.

